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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the NLRB 41 declaring a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion to be an unfair labor practice was somewhat abortive, since
the Board's order was denied enforcement on appeal,42 but a
recent Board decision stands as a reaffirmation and reiteration
of the legal principles first laid down.43
It is submitted that if federal labor policy dictates that the
individual's right to prosecute his own action for breach of con-
tract in court must be sacrificed to the needs of collective bar-
gaining, the individual's rights within those internal procedures
provided by contract ought to have complete protection. It seems
that the last recourse for the protection of these rights is a cause
of action against the union and the employer when the employee
is unfairly represented. Regardless of the forum chosen to re-
ceive such a cause of action, it is submitted that the existence
of an adequate remedy for an individual's valid claim is of para-
mount importance.
Reid K. Hebert
LOUISIANA MERCHANT DETENTION STATUTE
To assist storekeepers in coping with a burgeoning shop-
lifting problem,' the Louisiana legislature enacted, in 1958, a
merchant detention statute2 authorizing privileged detention of
suspected shoplifters for questioning. The statute joined a
growing list of similar legislation by most states; to date, forty-
five states have acted in some manner to combat shoplifting
through the various expedients of new criminal provisions,
broadened arrest powers and a qualified privilege for merchants
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in
a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
41. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
42. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
43. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (July 1, 1964), noted, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1221.
1. The number of reported shoplifting complaints rose 81% from 1958 to 1963,
and 13% from 1962 to 1963, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18 (1963). This
increase is attributed to greater opportunity made possible by the growth of self-
service merchandising. Shoplifting losses are estimated to run from .5% to
3% of sales, depending on the type of store. The estimated monetary loss is about
$300 million annually in the nation. See Gunn, An Advanced Study for Control-
ling External and Internal Retail Pilferage (1964) (unpublished thesis in Loui-
siana State University Library, used with permission) ; Comments, 62 YALE L.J.
788 (1953), 61 DIcK. L. REV. 256 (1957), 58 MIcH. L. Rav. 429 (1959).
2. LA. 1.S. 15:84.5, 84.6 (Supp. 1964).
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to detain suspected persons.- The Louisiana statute employs the
qualified privilege and enlarges a peace officer's arrest powers.
Prior to the adoption of the statute in Louisiana, a merchant
assumed serious risks in arresting shoplifters or detaining them
for questioning. Under the doctrine of tort liability for false
arrest or malicious prosecution, the merchant was liable for
unauthorized arrests.4 As a private citizen, he could arrest only
for a felony that had in fact occurred and which he had reason-
able grounds to believe the person arrested had committed; he
could not arrest for a misdemeanor. 5 Shoplifting is a felony if
the value of merchandise taken exceeds $20, and a misdemeanor
if under that amount.6 Since the majority of shoplifting in-
cidents involve misdemeanors, the merchant virtually acted at
his peril if he did make an arrest: if he arrested for a theft that
happened to be a misdemeanor, it was unauthorized and he was
civilly liable. If, on the other hand, the value of the goods stolen
exceeded $20, he had to establish reasonable cause for the arrest
and actual commission of a felony to avoid liability. The latter
requirement was difficult to meet because, to convict of theft,
an intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession must
be proved,7 and in most cases the customer would simply pro-
claim that he intended to pay for the article. Under the broader
doctrine of tort liability for false imprisonment,8 the merchant
3. Citations of the statutes can be found in Comment, 58 MIcn. L. REV. 429
(1959), supplemented in Annot., 80 A.I.R.2d 430 (1961). Without statutes are
California, Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey and Vermont.
4. See, e.g., Girlinghouse v. wahlen, 3 La. App. 720 (2d Cir. 1926).
5. LA. R.S. 15:61 (1950). In Girlinghouse v. Zwahlen, 3 La. App. 720 (2d
Cir. 1926), the court held the law does not allow a private person to deprive
another of his liberty without a warrant when the act is at most an element of a
misdemeanor. Dunson v. Baker, 144 La. 167, 80 So. 238 (1918), held that a
private person may arrest upon reasonable grounds, but he must also show that
a felony was committed. See Comment, 17 TuL. L. REV. 81 (1942) for a good
discussion of the laws applying to false arrest and false imprisonment in Loui-
siana.
6. Shoplifting is defined as "theft of goods displayed for sale." LA. R.S. 15:84.5
(Supp. 1964). It would be prosecuted under theft, id. 14:67, and would be sub-
ject to the regular theft distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
7. Id. 14:67.
8. False imprisonment requires a total and unlawful restraint of a person's
freedom of locomotion. Sweeten v. Friedman, 9 La. App. 44, 118 So. 787 (Onl.
Cir. 1928). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 35 (1934); LA. R.S. 14:46 (1950).
False imprisonment is a broad doctrine covering unauthorized detentions in gen-
eral; false arrest would cover the more specific cases when the false imprisonment
is under legal authority and there is a taking into custody. As far as shoplifting
is concerned, false imprisonment would arise when there was a detention without
an arrest; false arrest would arise when there was a citizens' arrest, or an arrest
by a police officer on the request of a merchant. In Louisiana, there has been
some confusion about the categorization of the two torts, and in many cases,
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was also subject to liability for detentions of customers that
did not constitute an arrest ;9 thus, he also acted at his peril if
he simply detained a suspected shoplifter for questioning.
Facing similar conditions, the courts in many common law
jurisdictions began to recognize a qualified privilege to detain
suspected shoplifters without liability if there were probable
cause for the detention. 10 In Louisiana, probable cause or rea-
sonable grounds for an arrest was sufficient to render a police
officer immune to civil liability for an authorized arrest without
a warrant;" however, the courts never directly extended im-
munity to private citizens. Dicta in two cases indicated approval
of a qualified privilege similar to the one established outside
Louisiana in the leading case of Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co.,1
2
but ultimately the legislature, rather than the courts, sought to
provide a solution to the merchants' predicament.
The Louisiana Merchant Detention Statute of 1958,18 as
recovery has been granted without distinguishing the two. See Comment, 17
Tmu. L. REv. 81 (1942).
9. Comment, 17 TUL. L. REV. 81, 82 (1942) ; see Crossett v. Campbell, 122
La. 659, 48 So. 141 (1909) ; Banks v. Food Town, Inc., 98 So.2d 719 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957).
10. The qualified privilege recognized in the leading case of Collyer v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 5 Cal.2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) has been widely followed and has
formed the basis of most of the later statutory privileges. It held that a private
person may detain another for investigation to protect his property, and that
probable cause to make the detention would be a defense in a false imprisonment
suit. The detention, however, had to be made in a reasonable manner. The
privilege is a restricted one, confined to what is reasonably necessary for its
limited purpose. See PROSSER, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Pellifigue v. Judice, 154 La. 782, 98 So. 244 (1923); Dunson v. Baker,
133 La. 167, 80 So. 238 (1918) ; Wells v. Gaspard, 129 So.2d 245 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961) ; see LA. R.S. 15:60 (1950); id. 15:62.
12. 5 Cal.2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936). In Sanders v. W. T. Grant, 55 So.2d
89, 92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951), the court said, "It is our opinion that had the
defendant specially pleaded qualified privilege, we would find merit to its con-
tention, but having failed to do so except by way of general denial, we cannot
sustain that conclusion." In Banks v. Food Town Inc., 98 So.2d 719 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957), the court quoted the holding of Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal.
2d 175, 54 P.2d 90 (1936), discussed note 10 supra, with approval and indicated
that the apparently contrary case of Girlinghouse v. Zwahlen, 3 La. App. 720
(2d Cir. 1926), could be distinguished.
13. LA. R.S. 15:84.5 (Supp. 1964) : "A. A peace officer, or a merchant, or
a merchant's specifically authorized employee, may use reasonable force to detain
for questioning for a length of time, not to exceed sixty minutes, on the merchant's
premises any person whom he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed
theft of goods displayed for sale by the merchant, regardless of the actual value
of such goods, and such detention shall not constitute an arrest. Wilful conceal-
ment of goods either inside or outside the store of the merchant is prima facie
evidence of intent to steal and permanently deprive the owner of his goods.
"B. A peace officer may arrest without a warrant any person whom he has
reasonable ground to believe has committed theft of goods displayed for sale,
NOTES
amended, authorizes the detention of suspected shoplifters,
provides that such detentions do not constitute an arrest, spe-
cifically confers immunity from false arrest and false imprison-
ment on those authorized to detain, and liberalizes the require-
ments for proof of an intent to steal. The detention authoriza-
tion extends to merchants, their specified employees and peace
officers. The detainer must have reasonable grounds to believe
the person has committed a theft. The detention must be for
questioning, must not exceed sixty minutes and must be made
on the merchant's premises; and reasonable force may be used
to accomplish it. To facilitate criminal prosecutions, the statute
provides that wilful concealment of goods is prima facie evi-
dence of intent to steal.
Only two Louisiana cases have construed the statute, and
both have construed it strictly.14 The requirement of reasonable
grounds for detention is held to demand more than mere suspi-
cion: detention must be grounded on substantial action by the
customer showing an intent to steal. In Wilde v. Schwegmann
Bros. Giant Supermarkets,", the court sustained a false im-
prisonment claim, ruling that the store detective who detained
the plaintiff was not privileged by the statute. The basis for
detention was the suspicion of a store detective who claimed
to have seen the customer hide a buffer pad in her purse. With-
out checking her sales slip, and relying on a statement by a
cashier that the plaintiff had not paid for the item, the detec-
tive detained her in a small windowless storeroom. It was shown
that the detective, who claimed to have watched the customer
regardless of the actual value of such goods. A charge made to a peace officer
by a merchant or a merchant's employee shall constitute reasonable grounds for
such arrest."
Id. 15:84.6: "No peace officer, merchant, or merchant's specifically authorized
employee shall be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false imprison-
ment of any person detained as provided in R.S. 15:84.5A or arrested under R.S.
15:84.5B where the said police officer, merchant, or merchant's specifically au-
thorized employee had reasonable ground at the time of the detention or arrest for
believing that the person detained or arrested committed theft of goods displayed
for sale, regardless of the actual value of such goods."
14. In 1963, a Louisiana appellate court considered an action for unlawful
detention and search of a suspected shoplifter without referring to the statute.
It denied the plaintiff's claim on the ground that she had impliedly consented
to be searched, Coates v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 152 So.2d 865
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), citing Banks v. Food Town Inc., 98 So.2d 719 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957). See note 12 aupra. The customer carried a shopping bag
into the store without checking it at a special counter despite a large sign direct-
ing customers to do so. The court found that the plaintiff had suffered at her
own fault and that the checking requirement was a reasonable one.
15. 160 So.2d 839 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
1965]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
closely, failed to notice some of her more obvious movements in
the store. The court found these grounds for detention unrea-
sonable; a basic requirement would have been to verify the sus-
picions by checking the sales slip. In another decision rendered
the same day, Chretien v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,1' the same court
affirmed a slander judgment against a store arising out of an
alleged shoplifting situation. The manager questioned a cus-
tomer after he received information from another customer and
observed items similar to those he sold in her translucent hand-
bag. He was in error, and the court indicated that information
from an unidentified stranger was not sufficient to constitute
reasonable grounds under the statute.17
Although it is difficult to impose a trend on the few decided
cases in this area of the law,'8 it seems that the majority of
states which have applied merchant detention statutes are in
accord with Louisiana's strict interpretation and require sub-
stantial grounds for reasonable cause. Mere suspicion of a cus-
tomer wearing a raincoat with bulging pockets who was not
seen taking anything was not reasonable grounds; detention
would be authorized only when the person had manifested an
intent to steal in some overt manner. 19 Detention on suspicion
where no one saw the customer as much as touch an article was
not privileged. 20 The fact that a clerk noticed that a dress which
a customer had been trying on was not in its place on a rack
was not reasonable grounds to detain ;21 neither was the fact
that shoes were missing from their display box when the plain-
16. 160 So.2d 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 75, 163 So.2d
356 ("no error of law").
17. The Louisiana statute provides a defense for the merchant in a civil
action arising from detention for shoplifting. An Ohio court has expressly ruled
that the burden of proving probable cause is on the detainer. Isiah v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 110 Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d 128 (1959), noted, 13
W. RES. L. REv. 527 (1962). It seems that this is the rule in Louisiana also,
although the courts have not so expressly ruled. In the cases in which the im-
munity of the qualified privilege has been denied, see notes 15 and 16, supra,
the courts held that the storekeepers had not reasonable cause to detain, appar-
ently recognizing that the burden of proof is on the merchant claiming the privi-
lege. See note 12 supra.
18. Search has produced only seven cases outside Louisiana which have con-
strued merchant detention statutes. The American Law Reports annotation on the
subject, 80 A.L.R.2d 430 (1961), is based on two cases; two additional cases
are listed in its supplements.
19. Isiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 110 Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d
128 (1959), noted, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 527 (1962).
20. J. C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So.2d 678 (1963).
21. Lukas v. J. C. Penney Co., 233 Ore. 345, 378 P.2d 717 (1963).
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tiffs were the only customers in the store.22 Probable cause was
found in a case in which the customer took an article, placed it
around her waist, and moved away from the clothes rack when
no sales personnel were present.
2
.
Only in Oklahoma has the statute been broadly applied. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld as probable cause the fact that
the storekeeper had seen the customer take articles on previous
occasions and was acting "suspiciously. '24 Applying Oklahoma
law, a federal court of appeals held that a jury might find rea-
sonable detention predicated solely on another customer's ac-
cusation.25
Another problem arises under the Louisiana statute's spe-
cific grant of immunity from civil and criminal liability for
false arrest and false imprisonment to those authorized to
detain.26 If the detention is authorized, it seems that civil and
criminal immunity would automatically follow and that no spe-
cific grant of immunity would be needed.27 Some states make
no specific grants of immunity; others provide more complete
enumerations. 28 The Louisiana approach can create a difficulty
if a detention is conducted in a defamatory manner. It could
be argued that the general authorization of detention covers
immunity from all liability; the opposite conclusion can be
reached by arguing that the enumeration is exclusive and that
slander was intentionally excluded from immunity. In Chretien
v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,29 the manner in which the store man-
ager questioned the plaintiff was found to be slanderous. He
22. Browning v. Pay-Less Service Shoes, Inc., 373 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963).
23. Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, 133 So.2d 331 (Fla. App. 1961).
24. Doyle v. Douglas, 390 P.2d 871 (Okla. 1964) (no error in allowing defend-
ant store manager to testify about general gravity of shoplifting problem).
25. J. C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959).
26. La. Acts 1960, No. 326, § 1, amended LA. R.S. 15:84.6, enlarging the im-
munity clause to grant immunity from civil and criminal liability, heretofore
granted only to peace officers, to all who were authorized to detain or arrest
suspected shoplifters.
27. See Louisiana Legislative Symposium: 1960 Regular Session- Criminal
Law and Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 66, 76 (1960).
28. See Comment, 58 MICH. L. REV. 429 (1959). Illinois and Utah, for ex-
ample, grant the qualified privilege and make no specific enumeration of the de-
fenses it provides, simply saying there shall be no liability. On the other hand,
Virginia specifically enumerates immunity from liability for false arrest, false
imprisonment, unlawful detention, malicious prosecution, slander, assault and
battery. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 38, §§ 252.1 to 252.4 (1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-13-30 to 77-13-32 (1953) ; VA. COnE §§ 18-187.1 to 18-187.3 (1950).
29. 160 So.2d 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 75, 163
So.2d 356 ("no error of law").
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made statements, heard by many customers, that imported that
the customer was trying to steal the store's merchandise. The
court said that, even had there been reasonable grounds for de-
taining the plaintiff, the qualified privilege of the statute would
not clothe the storekeeper with immunity when he resorted to
slander. Thus, the court seems to exclude slander from the civil
immunity granted by the statute. Mississippi's Supreme Court
has taken a similar view; found to be a slanderous, and therefore
unprivileged, detention was the halting of a customer on a stair-
way and making accusations of theft in a loud voice.80
The Louisiana statute allows detention for questioning only.
In Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets,5 1 detention
was used to obtain a confession from the customer, who was not
allowed to leave until she had signed a confession blank. The
court again construed the statute strictly, and denied the quali-
fied privilege because the detention went beyond questioning.
An analogous Texas statute8 2 gives a storekeeper the right to
seize property taken from his store by a shoplifter. This statute
has been strictly construed, a court finding that it does not
privilege detention when there is no accompanying seizure of
property. 83
Remaining unresolved are questions concerning the consti-
tutionality of the detention provisions. Neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the highest courts of any of the states
have decided the issue.84 The American Civil Liberties Union
30. J. C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 678 (1963). Under a
statute which provides that the detention must be reasonable, the Oregon Supreme
Court held to be unreasonable the apprehension of a customer on the street by a
store employee who did not identify himself and tussled with the customer to
inspect her shopping bag. Lukas v. J. C. Penney Co., 233 Ore. 345, 378 P.2d 717
(1963).
31. 160 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). In this case, the court said the
grounds for detention were unreasonable and that the detention itself went beyond
the privilege of the statute. It is arguable that the latter statement might be
considered dictum and unnecessary for the disposition of the case. However, the
strong language of the court in the latter regard seems to indicate that the two
grounds are concurrent holdings and the court based its decision on both points.
32. TEXAS PENAL CODE art. 1436e, § 2 (Supp. 1964) : "All persons have a
right to prevent the consequences of shoplifting by seizing any goods . . . which
have been so taken, and bring it, with the supposed offender, if he can be taken,
before a magistrate for examination, or delivering the same to a peace officer
for that purpose. To justify such seizure, there must, however, be reasonable
ground to suppose the crime of shoplifting to have been committed and the
property so taken, and the seizure must be openly made and the processing had
without delay."
33. Browning v. Pay-Less Service Shoes Inc., 373 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963).
34. North Carolina's Supreme Court has ruled constitutional a statute defining
[Vol. XXV
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maintains the statutes are unconstitutional," and it is possible
they might conflict with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution, and with the fourth and fifth
amendments. Applying these amendments, the United States
Supreme Court has recently ruled, in a case concerning arrest by
federal officers, that suspicion based on accusations of an un-
tested informer is insufficient to render an arrest without a
warrant constitutionally valid ;36 however, arrests without war-
rants are valid when there is probable cause and sufficient
grounds for them.3 7 State law enforcement officers are subject
to the same tests of constitutionality as federal officers,3 8 and
state statutes allowing private citizens, without a warrant, to
arrest for felonies and breach of the peace are valid.3 9 It seems
reasonable to assume that the constitutional standards applying
to arrest by officers would apply to detention by private citizens
authorized by state statutes, since the test of constitutionality
centers on what rights of an individual are protected. It should
not be a major distinction whether this right is invaded by
peace officers or by private citizens operating under state au-
thority. Thus, the statutes would probably be valid if they
require a reasonable cause test similar to that required of state
-and federal officers. Furthermore, the test of validity of arrests
generally centers not on the statutes, but on the particular arrest
which was made under the statute and whether it was reason-
able under the due process limitation. The court's policy is to
'judge the facts of each case on its merits. 40
Since suspicion alone is not reasonable grounds under the
due process limitation, and the Supreme Court's policy is to
enforce strictly the limitation,41 it seems that courts applying
detention statutes will have to tread carefully and require a
shoplifting as wilfully concealing goods without paying for them, with a provision
that finding goods concealed on a person shall be prima facie evidence of wilful
concealment. State v. Marie Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961). It held
the statute to be definite enough to notify potential shoplifters of the consequences
of the crime and that the presumption of intent to steal was a reasonable one.
35. See the reports of the ACLU: 39TH ANNUAL REPORT 93 (1958-59) ; 40Tu
ANNuAL REPORT 65 (1959-60), 41ST ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1960-61).
36. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1951) limits federal officers to make felony arrests
without a warrant to cases where the crime was committed in the presence of
officers or upon reasonable grounds. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1957).
38. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
39. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931) ; see 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 8,
(1955).




substantial test for reasonableness under the statutes to avoid
constitutional difficulties. A Texas court has taken this ap-
proach. In ruling that suspicion alone was not sufficient grounds
for detention, the court stated that if the legislature had au-
thorized a clerk to arrest on suspicion all persons in the store,
the statute would be of doubtful constitutionality.4 2
In summary, the Louisiana courts are applying the merchant
detention statute strictly, as are most courts in the United States
which have considered similar legislation. This interpretation
achieves a proper adjustment of two competing interests brought
into collision by the statutes: the right of a merchant to protect
his property from theft and the right of citizens to enjoy the
fundamental freedom of movement protected by the due process
clause. No matter how serious the shoplifting problem may be,
the measures taken to deal with it should not be allowed to
interfere seriously with individual constitutional rights. It is
submitted that the courts of Louisiana are pursuing a wise
course in strictly interpreting the statute to protect this basic
liberty.
It is also contended that the detention privilege cannot be
extended much further, and the existing privilege has not been
properly used. In a study of shoplifting based on surveys of
Louisiana stores, it was discovered that many security personnel
were unaware of the provisions of the detention statute and be-
lieved they could go much further than the law allows;48 this
may explain the problems arising from unauthorized detentions.
It would be helpful for merchants to learn exactly what their
privilege entails, what they can safely do: it seems that the
merchant can detain when he has seen a customer steal and
conceal an article, and then takes apparent and available steps,
as checking sales slips, to verify the theft. He can also detain
when the customer consents. When the basis for holding a cus-
tomer would be mere suspicious action-clothes with bulging
pockets, information from another customer and the like-de-
tention would be ill-advised, unless the item stolen is of great
value and the merchant is willing to take the risk of a false im-
prisonment suit. If he should choose to detain, he should pro-
42. Browning v. Pay-Less Service Shoes Inc., 373 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963).
43. Gunn, An Advanced Study for Controlling External and internal Pilferage




ceed politely and ask the customer to accompany him to an area
away from the presence of other persons; he could then ques-
tion the customer without fear of liability for slander. How-
ever, he should not attempt to coerce the customer into signing
a confession. It would be advisable to make the detention after
the customer has passed a check-out counter or has made some
movement toward leaving the premises, thus making it easier
to show that the customer did not intend to pay for the item.
It must be recognized that legislation is but one means
of combating shoplifting; too many merchants neglect to insti-
tute their own procedures to protect themselves. 44 Also, stores
are reluctant to prosecute for shoplifting because of fear of
creating bad public relations by harassing customers. Until
stores make more prosecutions, there will be little deterrence to
shoplifters; shoplifting will remain profitable and it will be dif-
ficult to curb.
In essence, each merchant must balance the risk of loss of
merchandise and loss through tort liability, considering also that
shoplifting losses are passed on to the customer and that many
methods of self-help for curbing shoplifting are available. Since
his profits are greater under self-service merchandising, the
merchant will probably continue using the present methods de-
spite the limited protection given by the statute. To improve the
situation, it is up to the merchant to use the state's restricted
privilege correctly, to prosecute more shoplifters, and to use
more effective practical means to curb shoplifting. The law
cannot do much more by extending detention statutes.
Lee Hargrave
44. Ibid. This recent master's thesis is based on surveys and interviews with
many store owners and security personnel. It presents a complete plan for effec-
tive control of shoplifting, emphasizing practical precautions a merchant can take,
including better trained security personnel, strategic placing of most-frequently
stolen merchandise where it can be watched closely, use of large mirrors, closed-
circuit television and fake TV cameras to act as real and psychological deterrents,
arrangement of counters so that all areas of the store can be readily observed,
coordinated and organized planning for apprehending shoplifters, and generally
better security procedures.
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